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Abstract 
Practitioners and academics often debate about cost overruns, a pivotal part of the iron-triangle that is 
traditionally used to assess the project management performance. Intuitively, the WHUP³FRVWRYHUUXQs´
refers to the situation where the actual costs are higher than the original estimates. However, especially 
in the case of long and complex projects, with several different budgets, significantly affected by scope 
changes, inflations, etc., WKHDVVHVVPHQWRI³cost overruns´ can still be subject of misunderstanding. 
This paper addresses this topic by proposing a way to define and assess cost overruns, particularly in 
the case of long and complex projects (also called megaprojects) and when publicly available 
information is scattered. This is exemplified using the case of Nuclear Decommissioning Projects and 
Programmes (NDPs) that are representative of the above-mentioned scenario. Lastly, this paper 
reflects on the importance of highlighting the existing constraints and the assumptions adopted during 
the appraisal of cost overruns. 
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Introduction  
Practitioners and academics often debate about cost overruns. But ZKDWLVWKHDFWXDOPHDQLQJRI³cost 
overruns´"7KHDQVwer might seem trivial: a cost overrun refers to the situation where the actual cost 
is higher than the original estimate. However, especially in the case of megaprojects, this construct can 
still be hard to define.  
Megaprojects are temporary endeavours (i.e. projects) characterized by: large investment commitment, 
a budget over £1 billion, vast complexity (especially in organizational terms), long planning and 
construction schedule. Megaprojects are affected by several high level risks and have a long-lasting 
impact on the economy, the environment, and the society (Ansar et al. 2016; Brookes & Locatelli 2015). 
Moreover, especially in the case of large and complex projects, the assessment of the cost overruns is 
hindered by the issue of data availability, reliability and integrity.  Indeed, trying to establish cost 
overruns is a very difficult task both outside an organisation (due to the lack of publically available 
and reliable data), but it is also hard within an organization, because (often) no proper targets are set. 
Consider the example in Figure 1. If a construction project was estimated to cost £100 after the concept 
screening phase and £150 after the detailed design phase, but the contract was ultimately awarded 
after the tendering process at £180 and the final actual cost of the project was £178, are we confident 
to say that the project is affected by cost overruns? Or: if the project was approved to proceed after the 
concept screening for £200, the detailed design estimated costs for £230, but the contract was awarded 
after the tendering process for £180 (at the lowest bid), and the final actual cost were £230, are we 
confident to say that the project was affected by cost overruns? And, if so, how much was the cost 
overruns? 
This case is comparable to the London Olympics 2012, where the initial estimates made by the Labour 
Government reached £2.4 billion in 2005 (when London won the bid). These estimates then raised to 
£9.3 billion, which allowed the Olympic Minister to declare that the project ZDV D ³VLJQLILFDQW
DFKLHYHPHQW´DQGDOORZHGWKH*RYHUQPHQWWR LVVXHDUHSRUWRQWKH2O\PSLFVEHLQJ ³XQGHUEXGJHW´
with £476 million of expected savings on the £9.3 billion budget (BBC 2007; MailOnline 2012). 
 Figure 1. Assessing cost overruns 
It may be considered surprising that neither the Project Management Body of Knowledge (2013) nor 
the Association of Project Management (2016) SURYLGHDGHILQLWLRQIRU³FRVWRYHUUXQs´RU³FRVWRYHU-
EXGJHW´, presumably assuming that its meaning is straightforward and its calculation clear. However, 
this paper argues that, especially in the situations where the development of a project is long and 
complex (e.g. megaprojects (Locatelli et al. 2014)), the assessment of cost overruns can be challenging.  
The authors address this topic by firstly reviewing how cost overruns are calculated in the literature. 
Secondly proposing a way to assess cost overruns in a rigorous and transparent way, especially in the 
cases where the number of projects is low and publically available information is scattered, such as 
megaprojects. This is exemplified using the case of Nuclear Decommissioning Projects (NDPs) that are 
representative for the above-mentioned scenario. Indeed, since nuclear decommissioning involves the 
management of radioactive material, NDPs are highly uncertain, complex, and long projects that involve 
several internal and external stakeholders (Invernizzi et al. 2017). Finally, this paper reflects on the 
importance of highlighting the assumptions adopted during the appraisal of cost overruns. 
The traditional assessment of cost overruns 
Cost overruns are traditionally calculated in absolute terms as in Eq 1 and in relative terms as in Eq 2. 
Eq 1: ࡯࢕࢙࢚࢕࢜ࢋ࢛࢘࢘࢔࢙ ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ ൌ  ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ െ ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ 
Eq 2: ࡯࢕࢙࢚࢕࢜ࢋ࢛࢘࢘࢔࢙ ሾ ?ሿ ൌ ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ ି࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ሾࢉ࢛࢘࢘ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ሿ  
Where ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ refers to the actual cost, i.e. the costs determined at the time of completing a project and ࡯࢏࢔ refers to the ³original estimated´ cost. Eq 2 UHIOHFWVWKH³3URMHFW&RVW*URZWK´PHWULFSUHVHQWHGLQ
(CII 2016) and below in Eq 3. 
Eq 3: ࡼ࢘࢕࢐ࢋࢉ࢚࡯࢕࢙࢚ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൌ ࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒ࢀ࢕࢚ࢇ࢒ࡼ࢘࢕࢐ࢋࢉ࢚࡯࢕࢙࢚ିࡵ࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ࡼ࢘ࢋࢊ࢏ࢉ࢚ࢋࢊࡼ࢘࢕࢐ࢋࢉ࢚࡯࢕࢙࢚ࡵ࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ࡼ࢘ࢋࢊ࢏ࢉ࢚ࢋࢊࡼ࢘࢕࢐ࢋࢉ࢚࡯࢕࢙࢚  
Table 1 provides a review of definitions of cost overruns and of the variables used to calculate it, i.e. ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ and࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒. 
However, even if it is a crucial point, few authors clarify the project stages (e.g. the points in time in 
the lifecycle) and the sources to which the figures refer to for the assessment of cost overruns. For 
instance, if we consider a 10-years project in a country with 3% inflation, the impact of inflation alone 
would EHA ZKLFKPHDQVDQLPSDFWRI7KHUHIHUHQFH\HDUIRU³FRVWHVWLPDWLRQ´
is therefore fundamental to understand if the project is over budget (Lind & Brunes 2015).  
Recently, Awojobi & Jenkins (2016, p.21) VWDWHGWKDW³the values for µestimated¶ [costs] are based on 
information documented at the approval stage of the projects, most of which can be found in the Staff 
Appraisal Reports (SARs) from the WoUOG%DQNZKLOHWKHYDOXHVIRUµDFWXDO¶ [costs] are determined by 
information at the end of construction, following the World Bank's Implementation and Completion 
5HSRUWV ,&5V´ In 2002, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, p.5) GHILQHG DFWXDO FRVWV DV WKH ³real, accounted 
construction costs determined at the time of project completion´ZKLOHHVWLPDWHGFRVWVGHQRWHd the 
budgeted oUIRUHFDVWHGFRQVWUXFWLRQFRVWV³at the time of decision to build´1. 
 
                                            
1
 ³Although the project planning process varies with project type, country, and time, it is typically possible for a 
JLYHQSURMHFWWRLGHQWLI\DVSHFLILFSRLQWLQWKHSURFHVVDVWKHWLPHRIGHFLVLRQWREXLOG´(Flyvbjerg et al. 2002) 
Ref Definition of Cost Overruns 
Absolute or 
relative? C?܍ܖ܌ ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ 
(Jadhav et al. 
2016) 
Cost overruns are defined 
DV³the difference 
between forecasted and 
DFWXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQFRVWV´ 
Absolute ୣ୬ୢUHIHUVWR³actual FRVWV´ ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to the ³EXGJHWHGDPRXQWV´ 
(Brookes & 
Locatelli 
2015) and 
(Locatelli, 
Invernizzi, et 
al. 2017) 
Projects were judged to 
be over-budget, i.e. to 
suffer from cost overruns, 
ZKHQ³the final cost of the 
project was greater than 
the 110% of the original 
estimate (adjusted for the 
LQIODWLRQ´ 
Relative 
ୣ୬ୢrefers to the costs ³at the point at which the 
project entered 
RSHUDWLRQ´ 
࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to the ³estimated costs´ZKRVH
figures was taken at the 
time as close as possible to 
³WKHILUVWIRUPDODFWLYLW\´
e.g. ³WKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIDQ\
land rights required for the 
SURMHFW´ 
(Ansar et al. 
2014) 
Cost overruns refer to 
³DFWXDORXWWXUQFRVWV
expressed as a ratio of 
estimated costs 
Relative ୣ୬ୢ UHIHUVWR³actual 
outturn costs´ 
࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ UHIHUVWR³estimated FRVWV´³HVWLPDWHGEXGJHW´
DQGRU³LQLWLDOEXGJHW´ 
(Tokede et al. 
2014) 
&RVWRYHUUXQV³insinuate 
the incongruence of initial 
estimates with final 
estimates, after or during 
the delivery of a project´ 
Absolute 
ୣ୬ୢ UHIHUVWR³final HVWLPDWHV´ both at the 
end and during the 
development of the 
project 
࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ UHIHUVWR³initial HVWLPDWHV´ 
(Merrow 
2011) 
Cost overruns are 
PHDVXUHGDV³the ratio of 
the actual final costs of 
the project to the estimate 
made at the full-funds 
DXWKRUL]DWLRQ>«@´ 
Relative: although 
not explicit in the 
definition, cost 
overruns are 
calculated as a 
percentage of the 
estimated costs 
ୣ୬ୢ UHIHUVWRWKH³the DFWXDOILQDOFRVWV´ ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to the ³estimate made at the full-IXQGVDXWKRUL]DWLRQ´ 
(Cantarelli et 
al. 2010) 
Cost overruns is 
calculated as ³$FWXDORXW-
turn costs minus 
estimated costs as a 
percentage of estimated 
FRVWV´ 
Relative 
ୣ୬ୢ refers to actual FRVWVZKHUH³actual 
costs are defined as 
real, accounted 
construction costs 
determined at the time 
RISURMHFWFRPSOHWLRQ´
as in (Flyvbjerg et al. 
2002) 
࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to estimated FRVWVZKHUH³estimated 
costs are defined as 
budgeted or forecasted 
construction costs 
determined at the time of 
WKHGHFLVLRQWREXLOG´as in 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2002) 
(Odeck 2004) 
Cost overruns refer to 
³Difference between 
DFWXDODQGHVWLPDWHGFRVW³ 
Absolute ୣ୬ୢ refers to the ³DFWXDOFRVW´ ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to the ³HVWLPDWHGFRVW´ ³Ratio of actual to 
HVWLPDWHGFRVWLQ´ Relative 
(Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2002) & 
following, e.g. 
(Flyvbjerg 
2008) 
Cost overruns is 
calculated as ³DFWXDOFRVWV
minus estimated costs in 
percent of estimated 
FRVWV´ 
Relative 
ୣ୬ୢ refers to actual FRVWVZKHUH³actual 
costs are defined as 
real, accounted 
construction costs 
determined at the time 
of projHFWFRPSOHWLRQ´ 
࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to estimated FRVWVZKHUH³estimated 
costs are defined as 
budgeted or forecasted 
construction costs 
determined at the time of 
WKHGHFLVLRQWREXLOG´ 
Table 1. Assessment of cost overruns in the literature 
Nevertheless, especially for long projects in the public sector, it is likely that multiple changes occur 
over time (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002)ZKLFKDIIHFWV WKHGHILQLWLRQRI ³original estimates´Cantarelli et al. 
(2010, p.4), quoting (Cantarelli et al. 2009)KLJKOLJKWWKDW³the estimated costs at the real decision to 
build are usually lower than those at later stages of the decision-making process´ZKLFKLVDVLWXDWLRQ
FDOOHG³lock-in´DQGWKDW³references to the formal decision to build do not always provide an accurate 
SLFWXUHRIFRVWRYHUUXQV´ (Cantarelli et al. 2010). Merrow (2011, p.38) defines ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒  DVWKH³estimate 
made at the full-IXQGVDXWKRUL]DWLRQ´, and suggests to evaluate cost overruns through (i) a systematic 
collection of a large number of cases, (ii) the calculation of cost overruns of single projects, and (iii) the 
definition of a threshold (25%) to determine the actual cost overruns. Tokede et al. (2014, p.19), who 
describe cost overruns as the incongruence between initial estimates and final estimates, take another 
VWHSIRUZDUGVSHFLI\LQJWKDWFRVWVFDQEHHYDOXDWHG³DIWHURUGXULQJWKHGHOLYHU\RIDSURMHFW´This shows 
a remarkable difference with the other publications of Table 1, as the authors argue that cost overruns 
can be calculated when the project is not finished yet but it is still ongoing. Similarly, Locatelli et al. 
(2016, p.11) define C?܍ܖ܌DVWKH³ILQDOFRVW´RUDVWKH³last estimate available for those [projects] still 
under construction´ Additionally, the CII (2016) HPSKDVL]HVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPHQWLRQLQJ³according 
to whom´WKHLnitial estimates are evaluated. This is extremely important, since the iron-triangle was 
originally adopting the contractor¶V perspective, and therefore most of the time is not even clear if the 
YDOXHVUHIHUWR³FRVW´RU³SULFH´WZRWRWDOO\GLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWs). Indeed, ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒  in the equations Eq 1 
and Eq 2 represent for the contractors the cost estimate used as a basis of the contract award, while 
for the owners ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒   refers to the budget at the time of authorization. 
In summary, to assess cost overruns, most of the authors: 
¾ rely mostly on the information on completed projects, where both the final costs and the initial 
HVWLPDWHV³DWWKHWLPHRIWKHGHFLVLRQWREXLOG´DUHDOVRDYDLODEOH 
¾ hardly ever highlight the boundary conditions and the assumptions regarding which point in time ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ  and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒  refer to;  
¾ give very limited attention to the provenance of the selected values of  ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ  and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒Ǥ 
Nevertheless, this limits the researches in industrial sectors where: 
¾ projects are particularly long, complex, affected by scope changes and subsequent re-baseline(s); 
¾ the number of completed projects is low; and/or  
¾ the information on these projects is scattered. 
In these cases, it is often not clear how to define  C?܍ܖ܌ and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒, and this affects the calculation of 
cost overruns. The following section recommends a transparent way to define cost overruns. 
How to define and assess cost overruns 
Cost, time and quality are the three pivotal measures of the so-FDOOHG³LURQ-WULDQJOH´WUDGLWLRQDOO\XVHG
for assessing the project management constraints. Quality comprises a broad range of topics (safety 
and security, environmental constraints, socio-economic aspects, stakeholders expectations, etc.) and 
can be assessed at different points in time and according to a number of different stakeholders involved 
in the project development (Davis 2014; Turner & Zolin 2012). Time is sometimes argued to be a better 
indicator project performances than costs, EHLQJ³PRUHYLVLEOH´harder to be manipulated and a driver 
for cost itself. Nevertheless, as presented in the previous sections, practitioners and academics often 
debate about cost overruns, which traditionally refers to the situation where the actual costs are higher 
than the original estimates. Since capital might be hard to find and it does not necessarily have a linear 
relationship with time, it is important to maintain and investigate cost parameters. 
Hence, as the aforementioned studies show that cost overruns can still be hard to define, this research 
suggests how to transparently assess cost overruns (to eventually and subsequently compare them). 
This is exemplified using the nuclear decommissioning industry, but the reasoning is similar for other 
projects and megaprojects.  
Nuclear decommissioning consists of all the administrative and technical actions to remove all the 
regulatory controls from a facility and restore the site to new use (IAEA 2017). Globally, NDPs costs 
estimates lie in the range of hundreds of billions of pounds, reaching £55 billion in France (WNA 2015) 
and almost £70 billion in the UK (NDA 2016a). Moreover, NDPs estimates are extremely challenging 
(Torp & Klakegg 2016) and keep increasing. This is partially due to the fact that the number of the 
completed NDPs is negligible compared to the new build, therefore there is limited data regarding the 
cost estimation. Indeed, in the nuclear industry, more than 500 Nuclear Power Plants have been built 
throughout the 20th century (and still the construction of new units is an enormous challenge), while 
only 16 have been fully decommissioned (OECD/NEA 2016).  
The following points are therefore highly recommended to assess the cost overruns: 
¾ First of all, clearly state which are the points in time in the project lifecycle, that ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers 
to. The ³RULJLQDO´HVWLPDWHGFRVWs at the start of the project might not be available, or might not 
even exist. So, it is fundamental to highlight the assumptions underpinning the selection of the 
point in time that ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ refers to. This is the case of the decommissioning of some nuclear sites, 
such as Sellafield (UK) (Sellafield Ltd 2016), where the operations of the site are so intertwined 
with the decommissioning ones that it is extremely hard to draw a line between the two. In this 
case, WKHVH³original´ estimates can be defined arbitrarily, but the reasons for this decision have to 
be clearly stated. For instance, the first publically available information regarding the ³original´
decommissioning cost estimates for Sellafield dates back to 2005, i.e. when the UK Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority was established (NDA 2016b), so these estimates can be taken into 
DFFRXQWWRGHILQH6HOODILHOG¶V࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒. 
¾ Secondly, clearly state which is the point in time that C?܍ܖ܌refers to. This can be challenging 
because tKH³ILQDO´DFWXDOFRVWVDWWKHHQGRIWKHSURMHFWmight not be available, or might not even 
exist (yet), and it is the case of very long projects that last several decades and/or never reached 
a conclusion (yet), again as the decommissioning of Sellafield (UK), but also construction projects 
such as the bridge on the Strait of Messina in Italy (CIOB 2015). The bridge on the Strait of Messina 
has been a ³political debate´ in Italy for a generation: a company was set up to build the bridge in 
the 1980s, and detailed design work was carried out in the 1990s, but the project was cancelled in 
2006. Nowadays, this bridge is back on the Italian agenda (CIOB 2015). In these situation, the 
³ILQDO´actual costs are not available, as the projects are not completed yet. However, the Estimate 
At Completion, LH³the expected total cost of completing all the work expressed as the sum of the 
actual cost to date and the estimate to complete´ (PMBOK 2013, p.539), can be used instead. This 
has to be clearly stated in order to define C?܍ܖ܌. 
¾ Clearly state by whom ࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ  and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒are defined, being aware of the difference EHWZHHQ³FRVW´
DQG³SULFH´ when assessing cost overruns. In IDFWRQHVWDNHKROGHU¶VSULFHLVDQRWKHUVWDNHKROGHU¶V
cost and talking about ³cost overruns´ only make sense if the viewpoint of one particular 
stakeholder is highlighted. 
Price is defined as in Eq 4DVDVXPRIWKHFRQWUDFWRUV¶FRVWVSOXVDPDUN-up.  
Eq 4: ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ ൌ ࡯࢕࢙࢚࢙ ൅ ࡹࢇ࢘࢑࢛࢖ 
In very simple terms, in a fixed-price contract (known as lump sum contract), the risks are assigned 
to the contractors, who is expected to request a higher mark-up to tackle uncertainties. In this 
situation, if the actual costs for the contractors increase and cost overruns occur, the mark-up is 
eroded SRWHQWLDOO\EHFRPLQJQHJDWLYHUHVXOWLQJLQWKHFRQWUDFWRUV¶ORVVHVEXWWKHRZQHULVQRW
affected by the cost overruns. Conversely, in a cost-reimbursable contract (known as a cost-plus-
fee contract), contractors are reimbursed by the owner for the actual cost of performing the work, 
plus a mark-up. In this situation, if the actual costs for performing the work increase compared to 
the budgeted ones, the owner is directly affected by the cost overruns as the prices rises. In other 
cases, stakeholders create a temporary organisation, called Special Purpose Vehicle (Sainati et 
al. 2015), that further complicates the difference between price and cost. 
Moreover, for major and mega projects, estimates are made summing up sub-projects cost 
estimates. These sub-projects cost estimates refer to the price that will be paid to the contractors 
(and not the actual costs of the work to be done). This price is normally higher than the cost of 
work to guarantee a mark-up for the contractors. However, it may be lower for strategic reasons, 
e.g. to gain the first-mover advantage, or when the actual profit is not made by the selling of the 
product itself, but of the products and services that the client will need after having bought the first 
item. 
7KLVZRUNVERWKIRU³VPDOOHUSURMHFWV´VXFKDVSULQWHUFDUWULGJHVIRUSULQWHUVFoffee capsules for 
coffee machines, and more significant ones, such as uranium for refuelling nuclear power plants. 
On the latter topic, Anne Lauvergeon (CEO of Areva - a French multinational group specializing in 
nuclear power and renewable energy, for ten years) stated in 2008 that the model of the CEA, a 
French public government-funded research organisation was indeed following the model of coffee 
machines and coffee capsules (Challenges 2008).  
Therefore, it is pivotal to clarify ³DFFRUGLQJWRZKRP´࡯ࢋ࢔ࢊ  and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒are defined.  
¾ Highlight to which stage of the development of the project the estimates refer to (e.g. concept 
screening, detailed design, etc.) and which is the degree of uncertainty associated to it, as different 
project stages present different uncertainty levels (GIF 2007) and P50 estimates are significantly 
different than P80 estimates (UK Government 2015).  
Some uncertainties are caused by known unknowns, so they cannot be dealt with upfront. Others 
can be mitigated at an early stage of the project development, such as the specification employed 
at the procurement stage to share the risk of delays in the supply of equipment and services. For 
example, in the comparison between two NDPs, Sellafield (UK) and Rocky Flats (US) (Invernizzi 
et al. 2017), it is highlighted that the sharing of responsibility between the US Government and the 
contractors (in an agreement cDOOHG³JRYHUQPent-IXUQLVKHGHTXLSPHQWDQGVHUYLFHV´KHOSHG WR
avoid delays in the delivery of products or services (Cameron & Lavine 2006) and ultimately avoid 
cost overruns. 
¾ Investigate scope change(s) and eventual re-baseline(s), highlighting the different contractual 
agreements, which can influence the project performance (Suprapto et al. 2016). 
Scope changes refers to any change to the project scope, and almost always requires an 
adjustment to the project cost or schedule; scope creep is the uncontrolled expansion to product 
or project scope without adjustments to time, cost, and resources (PMBOK 2013). So, when scope 
creep occurs, the additional costs are mostly sustained by the contractor who might have a limited 
understanding and visibility of the overall economic impact of accommodating all the FOLHQWV¶ 
requirements.  
On the other hand, scope changes are dealt with in different ways depending on the type of 
contract agreements: in fixed-price contracts, changes in scope are accommodated generally with 
an increase of the contract price, while in cost-reimbursable contracts, the client has the flexibility 
to re-direct the contractors whenever the scope of work could not have been precisely defined at 
the beginning (PMBOK 2013) . This means that, if scope changes are agreed by both parties under 
D UHLPEXUVDEOH FRQWUDFW VFRSH FKDQJHV FKDQJH WKH ³RULJLQDO HVWLPDWHV´ DQG FRVWs are re-
EDVHOLQHGZLWKRXWFDXVLQJDQLQFUHDVHRIWKHFRVWRYHUUXQVEXW³RQO\´DQLQFUHDVHRIWKHRYHUDOO
project cost.  
Moreover, Lind & Brunes (2015) have also summarized the causes of scope changes (i.e. changes 
in the design, in the production function, in the price of the factors of production, and due to 
inefficiencies), highlighting the importance of clustering them according to the different phases of 
the project development in which they occur and the cost overruns that they cause. Unforeseen 
ground conditions are also source of dispute (Fender-Allison & Mcewen 2017; Clarke 2015). 
In summary, it has to be emphasized to which re-baseline ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒refers to when calculating the 
cost overruns, and the assumptions that underpin the selection of this particular point in time. For 
example, in the nuclear industry, scope changes might be trigger by external events that cause 
changes in the regulations (e.g. like the ones triggered by the Fukushima accident).  
¾ Lastly, clearly state the financial assumptions for the assessment of the cost overruns. In fact, 
inflation, discount factors to model the cost of financing the business activities, assumptions 
regarding the currency and fluctuations in the rate exchanges can affect the costs significantly. 
Again, taking the example of decommissioning, the OECD/NEA (2010, p.58) DIILUPWKDW³a one-half 
percent change in either inflation/escalation or discount rate has a far greater effect on long-term 
costs than any single cost driver´. 
Addressing these points would enable the clear definition of ܥ௘௡ௗ  and ࡯࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ࢇ࢒and therefore allow a 
transparent assessment of the cost overruns.  
Conclusion 
Cost overruns have always drawn the attention of both practitioners and academics. However, 
particularly in the case where projects are long, complex, affected by scope change(s) and subsequent 
re-baseline(s), the assessment and comparison of cost overruns can still be extremely challenging. This 
paper stems from the established literature and presents a way to address these challenges to assess 
the cost overruns. In particular, it is envisaged to clearly state the assumptions concerning the point in 
time that ܥ௘௡ௗ  and ܥ௜௡ refer to, the point of view that is adopted (cost overruns - according to whom?), 
the scope changes and the financial aspects. This enables the transparent and rigours assessment of 
the cost overruns, which is particularly important in the case of major and megaprojects. 
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